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Some find the very idea of just war theory laughable. Of those, some deny that morality 
applies at all once the guns strike up; for others, morality always applies, everywhere, and 
it could never license the exceptional horrors of war. The first group are sometimes called 
realists. The second group are pacifists. The task of just war theory is to strike a middle 
path between them: to justify war, but also to limit it (Ramsey [1961]).  
Wherever there have been wars—which is everywhere, in every age—lawyers, theolo-
gians, philosophers and others have sought to walk this line, to explain how war can some-
times be justified, but that it must always be restrained. Though most commonly associat-
ed with the Christian tradition, discussion of the ethics of war can be found in every cul-
ture.2 But in this essay I will focus on contemporary just war theory, in the work of Anglo-
phone analytical philosophers. I’ll call this analytical just war theory. And I will focus on 
the debate between the most prominent contemporary just war theorist, Michael Walzer, 
and his revisionist critics. Narrower still, I will focus on one question raised in that debate: 
how ought we to fight? 
The ‘ought’ in that question is unqualified. Our topic is not merely ‘what say the laws of 
war’? Nor is it an exposition of rules of engagement. Our focus instead is on the categorical 
moral ought—the one that admits of no exceptions. How, morally, ought we to fight?  
Some will struggle, again, to make sense of this question. They might be sceptical about 
the very idea of a categorical moral ought, denying that there are any moral truths, or else 
arguing that morality itself is conventional, or culturally relative. But war is a tough arena 
for sceptics and relativists. For is there any judgement of which we are as certain, as the 
one that it is wrong to intentionally kill children to coerce their government into political 
or territorial concessions? Although we can’t make much progress by focusing on easy cas-
es alone, we cannot vindicate the deep moral revulsion that such scenarios inspire without 
acknowledging objective facts about the morality of war.3 
Of course, there is a further question of just how we can argue about the morality of 
war. The standard tools of scientific enquiry are of little use here; nor can we hope to make 
much progress by focusing only on internal logical consistency. Instead,  most analytical 
just war theorists adopt the method, made famous by John Rawls [1999: 42-5], of ‘reflective 
equilibrium’. On this approach, we develop moral arguments by taking our considered 
judgements about the permissibility of action in particular cases, and trying to identify the 
underlying principles that unify them.4 We then take those principles and test how they 
apply to other cases—real or hypothetical. If the principles generate conclusions that con-
flict with our considered judgements of what one ought to do in those cases, then we must 
either revise the principles, or revise our judgements. As our project evolves, and we revise 
our principles in light of our judgements, and our judgements in light of our principles, we 
                                                        
1 Many thanks to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the MacArthur Foundation for sponsoring 
this project, and to my colleagues at the Academy’s workshops for their many helpful suggestions. Thanks in 
particular to Nancy Sherman, and to Scott Sagan. 
2 For comprehensive historical sources, see Reichberg et al. [2006]; Reichberg and Syse [2014]. 
3 Not much hangs on whether you agree with this point. Most of what follows could be rephrased to fit with 
some alternative metaethical stance.  
4 Whose considered judgements matter? As I understand reflective equilibrium, each of us needs to make 
use of his or her own judgements about cases, rather than conduct surveys etc. Of course, if you find that 
your considered judgements are radically out of step with everyone else’s, then that gives you some reason to 
revise them.  
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approach reflective equilibrium. The underlying standard of epistemic justification is co-
herentist: what justifies my confidence in my judgement about a particular case is that it 
coheres with my judgements across a range of cases, as well as with an underlying princi-
ple that explains them all at once; likewise I am justified in believing in a particular moral 
principle because of its coherence with other plausible principles, as well as its tendency to 
deliver reflectively acceptable verdicts across a range of actual and hypothetical cases. 
The question of what we may do in war contrasts with that of when we may fight wars 
in the first place. In this paper I focus only on how we may fight, not on when. Narrower 
still, I will focus on three candidate principles, which purport to govern the conduct of hos-
tilities: 
Noncombatant Immunity: Intentionally killing noncombatants is impermissi-
ble.5 
Proportionality: Unintentionally killing noncombatants is permissible only if 
it is proportionate to the goals the attack is intended to achieve. 
Combatant Equality: These principles and others governing conduct in war 
apply identically to all combatants, regardless of what they are fighting for. 
These three principles do not exhaust the question of how to fight.6 But they are at its core. 
They divide the possible victims of war into two classes—combatants and noncombatants. 
They place no constraints on killing combatants.7 But noncombatants may be killed only 
unintentionally, and even then, only if the harm that they suffer is proportionate to the in-
tended goals of the attack.8 Obviously, then, little is more crucial for understanding these 
principles than knowing what makes one a combatant. For this paper, however, I will not 
dwell on that question. Combatants are members of the armed forces of a group that is at 
war, and non-members who directly participate in hostilities. Noncombatants are not 
combatants. These are deceptively simple categories. Hard cases abound. But these princi-
ples raise challenging enough philosophical problems when considering only the clear-cut 
cases.  
Each of Noncombatant Immunity, Proportionality, and Combatant Equality has deep philo-
sophical roots. In one form or another, each has always had its proponents in the various 
branches of the just war tradition.9 But they have been most clearly articulated and es-
poused not in theological or philosophical work, but in twentieth century international 
law. In particular, each achieved definitive expression in the first additional protocol to the 
Geneva conventions, 1977.10 For Noncombatant Immunity, see, for example, the Basic Rule, 
article 48, which states: 
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and 
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish be-
tween the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects 
and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only 
                                                        
5 For simplicity, throughout I focus on killing, but everything I say applies to other harms as well. 
6 The most important omission is the principle of necessity, which constrains intentional and unintentional 
killing of combatants and noncombatants alike (some call this the principle of due care, or precautions in 
attack). In its most straightforward form, it prohibits unnecessary harms—harms that need not be inflicted 
for one’s goal to be achieved. I leave necessity aside in this paper, because it is not in dispute between revi-
sionist and Walzerian just war theorists. For more on necessity, see Lazar [2012]. 
7 Other principles prohibit harming combatants in particular ways—for example with poisonous gas. 
8 Notice that Proportionality is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for permissibility.  
9 Though see Reichberg [2013]. 
10 This, in turn, drew on a tradition of international law going back at least to the St Petersburg Declaration of 
1868. 
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against military objectives.11 
Proportionality corresponds to the part of article 51(4) which prohibits indiscriminate at-
tacks, then includes within that definition  
an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, in-
jury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which 
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated.12 
Combatant Equality is more obliquely provided for in international law, and yet it is there. 
Article 43 (among other locations) gives sufficient conditions for one’s counting as a com-
batant—that one is a member of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict, other than medi-
cal personnel and chaplains—and states explicitly that ‘combatants… have the right to 
participate directly in hostilities’.13 The Preamble, meanwhile, makes clear that these prin-
ciples apply 
without any adverse distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed 
conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the Parties to the con-
flict. 
Analytical just war theory owes much more to these legal instruments than it does to the 
historical just war tradition. These laws, of course, were themselves shaped by that tradi-
tion. But the contemporary just war debate began not with an exposition of classical doc-
trine, but with an attempt to vindicate these legal and customary norms. And it began, ser-
endipitously, with a book that was published the same year as was the first additional pro-
tocol.14 
 
Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars (1977) had a profound influence in numerous aca-
demic disciplines, as well as in public policy and military education. Its uptake in analyti-
cal just war theory is only one dimension of that influence. The book is wide-ranging, tak-
ing on realists and pacifists, addressing questions of resort, conduct, and aftermath, and 
focusing on topics that have since been largely (and inexplicably) neglected, such as the 
ethics of sieges, reprisals, and maintaining a stance of neutrality while other states make 
war. Noncombatant Immunity, Proportionality, and Combatant Equality are just one part of his 
theory. And yet, they are at the heart of the ‘war convention’ that Walzer sought to vindi-
cate, ‘the set of articulated norms, customs, professional codes, legal precepts, religious 
and philosophical principles, and reciprocal arrangements that shape our judgements of 
military conduct’ [2006b: 44].15 
The chief virtue of Walzer’s core argument for these three principles is its simplicity: a 
single argument underpins Noncombatant Immunity and Combatant Equality, and lays the 
foundations for Proportionality. The basic idea is simple. Individual human beings enjoy 
fundamental rights to life and liberty, which prohibit others from using or harming them 
in certain ways. Since fighting wars obviously involves depriving others of life and liberty, 
                                                        
11 Article 48, first additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions. This basic principle is reiterated at a num-
ber of sites in international law. 
12 Article 51(4b), first additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions. 
13 Article 43(2), first additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions. 
14 Of course, this was no mere coincidence. Both the protocol and Walzer’s book emerged in response to the 
Vietnam war, and the turmoil of anticolonial warfare. Thanks to Scott Sagan for pointing this out. 
15 Some would deny that Walzer is an analytical just war theorist. This strikes me as tendentious. His method 
is more conventionalist than others in the discipline, but still has the same coherentist form: he draws con-
sidered judgements about particular cases from the war convention, then attempts to identify principles that 
will vindicate those judgements. Most significantly, he was one of the first just war theorists (perhaps after 
Grotius) to ground an account of the ethics of war in a universal theory of individual human rights.  
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it can be permissible only if each of the victims has, ‘through some act of his own… sur-
rendered or lost his rights’ [2006b: 135]. This point is general: Walzer claims that ‘a legiti-
mate act of war is one that does not violate the rights of the people against whom it is di-
rected’ [2006b: 135].  
Walzer then claims that ‘simply by fighting,’ all combatants, ‘have lost their title to life 
and liberty’ [2006b: 136]. He suggests two arguments for this conclusion. The first is that 
simply by posing a threat to me, a person alienates himself from me, and from our com-
mon humanity, and so himself becomes a legitimate target of lethal force [Walzer [2006b: 
142]. The second has more to do with consent: by participating in the armed forces, a com-
batant has ‘allowed himself to be made into a dangerous man’ [2006b: 145], and thus sur-
renders his rights. But the crucial point is this: besides combatants, ‘everyone else retains 
his rights’ [2006b: 136]. Noncombatants are ‘men and women with rights, and… they can-
not be used for some military purpose, even if it is a legitimate purpose’ [2006b: 137].16 
These simple building-blocks give us both Noncombatant Immunity and Combatant 
Equality. The former, because noncombatants, in virtue of retaining their rights, are not 
legitimate objects of attack. The latter, because all combatants lose their rights, regardless 
of what they are fighting for, so as long as they confine their attacks to enemy combatants, 
they will fight legitimately, because they will not violate anyone’s rights.  
Proportionality requires a little more work. Walzer says that individual noncombatants 
have rights not to be used to advance military goals. He later argues that their rights do not 
protect them—or at least not to the same degree—against being harmed in the course of 
achieving military objectives. Rather than in a detailed account of the difference between 
haring someone incidentally, and harming them as a means, his argument for Proportional-
ity is grounded in compromise: wars cannot be fought without unintentionally killing 
noncombatants, so if we are to deny pacifism, we must allow some unintended killing of 
noncombatants, provided it is proportionate to the objective aimed at. Indeed, besides 
merely being proportionate, it must also minimise risk to the noncombatants, at least 
when that is weighed against the objective aimed at, and against additional risks undertak-
en by the combatants to reduce the risk to noncombatants. 
In Just and Unjust Wars, as well as elsewhere, Walzer provides various supplementary 
arguments for these core principles of just conduct in war. In particular, he argues that the 
similarity between the experiences and motivations of combatants on both sides of most 
conflicts underpins Combatant Equality. They tend to believe that they are justified in 
fighting, and indeed fight for good reasons—for example, loyalty, a belief that their coun-
try is under threat, and trust in their leaders [2006b: 127]. Where these reasons are absent, 
they often fight under duress. In either case, they fight because they think they have to. 
The argument is somewhat opaque, but perhaps best understood in this way: it would be 
hypocritical of either side’s soldiers to blame the other’s for fighting, when they are all so 
similar, and act out of such similar motivations. Additionally, since from each soldier’s 
perspective it is really just luck that determines whether his war is just, we might think it 
unfair to make unjust combatants alone bear the costs of their bad luck (Lazar [2009: 723]). 
In later work, Walzer also argues that the distinctly collective nature of participation in the 
military knits combatants together; regardless of what they do as individuals, the mere fact 
of their membership in the collective that is actively engaged in hostilities makes them lia-
ble to harm in a way that is not true for non-members (Walzer [2006a]). 
 
In Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer aimed both to interpret and to justify the war convention. 
It would therefore be misleading to reduce his contribution to a series of arguments that 
                                                        
16 Controversially, Walzer thought that Noncombatant Immunity could not be absolute—in ‘supreme emer-
gencies’ it might be permissible intentionally to attack noncombatants. I set that exception aside here, but 
see Walzer [2006b: 251ff]. 
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stand or fall on their merits. If those arguments fail, then his attempt to justify the war 
convention fails. But his interpretation of that convention might still ring true, such that 
even if his arguments do not vindicate that convention, we had better find some argument 
that does, lest our theory be radically out of step with most people’s considered judge-
ments about war. 
And yet, Walzer did not just interpret; he also made arguments. And those arguments 
must be tested like any others.17 And analytical just war theorists have developed powerful 
objections to Walzer’s core arguments for Noncombatant Immunity and Combatant Equality. 
Proportionality is also controversial, though less so. The most influential proponent of the 
‘revisionist’ critique of Walzer has been Jeff McMahan [1994, 2004, 2009], but similar ar-
guments have been advanced by others such as Robert Holmes [1989], Richard Norman 
[1995], David Rodin [2002], Lionel McPherson [2004], Tony Coady [2008], Cécile Fabre 
[2012], and Helen Frowe [2014], among many others. 
The simplest, and I think most telling objection against Combatant Equality brings it in-
to conflict with Proportionality (McMahan [1994]; Rodin [2002]; Hurka [2005]). Unintended 
noncombatant deaths are permissible only if proportionate to the military objective 
sought. That means that the objective is worth that much innocent suffering. But what is a 
‘military objective’ worth? Grant for the moment that the 2003 invasion of Iraq was unjust. 
How many innocent deaths would its successful completion have been worth? How many 
innocent deaths were proportionate to Assad’s forces regaining control of Homs? How 
many would be proportionate to Joseph Kony’s LRA driving African Union forces out of 
South Sudan? 
In each case the answer is obvious: none. Proportionality is about weighing evils: the 
evil inflicted against the evil averted (Lee [2012]).18 But the military success of unjust com-
batants does not avert evil, it is itself evil. Evil intentionally inflicted can only add to, not 
counterbalance, unintended evils.  
It is important to see the force of this argument. Combatant Equality simply cannot be 
true.19 All war involves unintended innocent deaths—most uncontroversially, the deaths 
of children. If these deaths cannot be justified, then fighting is wrong. And if all you do is 
advance wrongful aims, then you achieve no good that can outweigh these additional un-
intended wrongs. So these unintended deaths cannot be justified, so fighting is wrong. The 
laws of war, applying as they do ‘without any adverse distinction based on the nature or 
origin of the armed conflict’, cannot be directly grounded in objective moral norms.20  
The revisionists, however, did not stop there. They developed further arguments 
against Combatant Equality, which also wound up undermining Noncombatant Immunity. 
The first move is to accept Walzer’s premise that permissible killing in war does not violate 
the rights of those against whom it is directed. These revisionists agree with Walzer that, in 
war, combatants may intentionally kill all and only those who have ‘surrendered or lost’ 
their rights to life and liberty.  
But here is the problem. Our rights to life and liberty are a big deal. They are directly 
connected to our possession of moral status, indeed, might even be constitutive of it. We 
cannot surrender or lose these rights except when we do something that warrants such a 
                                                        
17 By this I mean: verify whether the underlying principles have tenable implications when extended to other 
actual and hypothetical cases besides those Walzer considers. 
18 Or you might say, the good achieved against the evil inflicted (but the good achieved would invariably be 
the evil averted).  
19 In rejecting Combatant Equality, we are also rejecting Walzer’s ‘independence thesis’, that the rules for just 
conduct in war are independent of those for just resort to war.  
20 They might still be indirectly grounded, since these might be the rules that, for example, minimise wrong-
ful killing overall. I lack the space to consider this option in detail, but it is one natural recourse for those 
who would defend broadly Walzerian conclusions. See, especially, Shue [2008]; Dill and Shue [2012]; Shue 
[2013]. 
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severe fate.21 And Walzer’s account of how these rights are lost is simply not plausible. He 
argues that combatants lose their rights to life and liberty because they themselves threat-
en the lives of others. Their dangerousness grounds their liability. But merely posing a 
threat to others—even a lethal threat—is not sufficient to warrant surrender of one’s fun-
damental rights, because sometimes one threatens others’ lives for very good reasons.  
Allied soldiers landing on the shores of Normandy during the Second World War were 
fighting against genocide and imperialist expansion; their adversaries were defending 
those iniquitous ends.22 How could the Allies lose their rights to life and liberty by threat-
ening the lives of those who are defending genocide and bloody imperialism? Returning to 
the present, why would the soldiers of the Kurdish Peshmerga, heroically fighting to res-
cue Yazidi Christians from Daesh’s genocidal attacks, lose their rights not to be killed by 
their fascist adversaries? In no other sphere of human activity would we think that posing 
threats to others in the pursuit of a just aim, where those others are actively trying to thwart 
that just aim, would void or vitiate one’s rights against being harmed by those very people. 
Merely posing a threat to another’s life cannot justify the loss of one’s rights. Combatants 
fighting for just aims are not permissible targets in war. So Combatant Equality must be 
false: just combatants are permitted to kill unjust combatants, but not vice versa. 
Posing a threat oneself is not sufficient for one to be liable to be killed. Nor is it neces-
sary. This is more controversial, but revisionists have long argued that what grounds liabil-
ity to be killed, in war as elsewhere, is not that one poses a threat to another’s life, but that 
one is responsible for such a threat, and that the threat is wrongful. One can be responsible 
for a threat without posing it, as the United States President is responsible for a drone 
strike which he orders to go ahead, even though he does not himself fire the weapon. Simi-
larly, from his villa in Abbottabad, Osama Bin Laden could not plausibly pose any threats 
himself. But that does not prevent one mounting a self- or other-defence-based justifica-
tion for the US having killed him, since from that building he would at least have inspired, 
and perhaps directed, many other attacks.  
As many have noted, this argument undermines Noncombatant Immunity (McMahan 
[1994]; Frowe [2014]). In at least some states, noncombatants play an important role in the 
resort to military force. In modern industrialized countries, as much as 25 per cent of the 
population works in war-related industries (Downes [2006: 157-8], see also Gross [2010: 159]; 
Valentino et al. [2010: 351]); we provide the belligerents with crucial financial and other 
services; we support and sustain the soldiers who do the fighting; we pay our taxes and in 
democracies we vote, providing the economic and political resources without which war 
would be impossible. Our contributions to the state's capacity over time give it the strength 
and support to concentrate on war. If the state’s war is unjust, then many noncombatants 
are responsible for contributing to wrongful threats. They are therefore permissible tar-
gets. So, by these lights, Noncombatant Immunity too is false.23 
Most revisionists accept Proportionality. But the same techniques used against Combat-
ant Equality and Noncombatant Immunity place its application to war in doubt. First, note 
that the licence to unintentionally kill innocent people in war is far more permissive than 
would ever be plausible outside of war. Outside of war we almost never contemplate 
knowingly killing innocent people as a side-effect of pursuing our legitimate objectives.24 
                                                        
21 One might understand our rights to life and liberty as instead having these exceptions built into their speci-
fication. But then there would be something that grounds the right, which must be overridden for the excep-
tion to be built in. This would just be a terminological change, not a substantive one. 
22 Of course they also had other reasons to fight—for example, to defend their comrades-in-arms. I discuss 
the possible justificatory force of such reasons in Lazar [2013]. 
23 Some think that noncombatants’ responsibilities are especially salient in asymmetric conflicts, in which 
are often crucial to the combatants’ ability to fight. See, for example, Gross [2010]. 
24 We often permit practices that will predictably lead to accidents, but that’s different from knowingly in-
flicting such casualties. Mass vaccination programmes might be another example, though in those we run 
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What, then, explains the additional leeway granted in war?  
Moreover, many philosophers think that the purported moral distinction between in-
tended and unintended killing is illusory (e.g. McIntyre [2001]). Even supposing we set 
their worries aside, whose intentions matter in war? The trigger-puller’s? His immediate 
superior, who ordered him to fire? The commander who ordered the attack? The politician 
who ordered the advance? Does it really make sense to speak of intentions when war-
making is such a corporate effort?  
Perhaps even these questions have answers. Still, Walzer’s argument for Proportionality 
is very quick. If Proportionality were not true, we could never fight justified wars. But why 
treat that as an argument for Proportionality, rather than the first step towards pacifism? 
We need some other argument against pacifism than that it would make war impermissi-
ble! 
So, Combatant Equality is doubly false. Combatants who unintentionally kill noncom-
batants in the pursuit of unjust aims cannot satisfy Proportionality. But their intentional 
killing is also wrongful, as long as they target combatants fighting for just aims, who retain 
their rights to life—in the relevant sense, those just combatants are innocent. Noncombatant 
Immunity is false because noncombatants, like combatants, can be responsible for contrib-
uting to wrongful threats to others’ lives, and so can themselves become liable to be killed. 
Proportionality is more widely endorsed, but many think it rests on a spurious distinction 
between intended and unintended killing, and certainly Walzer’s argument for it begs the 
question against pacifism. 
 
Thus far the revisionist critique of Walzer appears successful. So we have two options: ar-
gue that the war convention is mistaken, and Combatant Equality, Noncombatant Immunity, 
and perhaps Proportionality are all false, at the level of objective morality—that is, be truly 
revisionist. Or we can advance new arguments in those principles’ support. I think that we 
should devote all our intellectual resources to the latter goal, accepting the former only if 
all else fails.  
For consider what we would be giving up. Combatant Equality one can take or leave; it is 
already pragmatically justified by the fact that combatants will almost always believe that 
they are fighting for just aims, so any constraints applied to those fighting unjustly would 
simply be ignored. But giving up on Noncombatant Immunity and Proportionality is giving 
up on a lot.  
If we reject these two principles, then we could go one of two ways. We could argue 
that intentional and unintentional killing of noncombatants is no worse than killing com-
batants, or that killing combatants is no better than killing noncombatants. The first path 
leads to unrestrained warfare, the second to pacifism.  
But can we really believe that it is wrong for the Peshmerga to fight against Daesh, de-
fending Yazidis against genocide, just because they will inevitably kill some innocent peo-
ple along the way? And can we really accept that when the Daesh kill Yazidi noncombat-
ants, their actions are no worse than when they kill the Peshmerga fighters? Can we en-
dorse the reasoning behind arguments that there is no such thing as an ‘innocent civilian’ 
in Gaza, because the Palestinians elected Hamas (Eiland [2014])? Or the terrorists’ parallel 
arguments for the permissibility of targeting citizens of western countries because they are 
responsible for their governments’ foreign policies (bin Laden [2002])? These costs are too 
great to bear. We cannot simply accede to aggression. And we must not fight without re-
straint. 
In what remains of this paper, I cannot hope to decisively vindicate the war convention. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
risks, rather than knowingly killing innocent people, the number risked is almost always very small relative 
to those benefited, and vaccinations are in the ex ante interest of all those who receive them, even those who 
end up, ex post, being harmed. Thanks again to Scott Sagan here. 
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But I can sketch an account, and indicate the most promising direction of travel.  
 
We can start with what should be a truism. Every person’s innocent happiness makes the 
world a better place. More generally, our flourishing contributes value to the universe. 
And we always have some reason to make the world a better place. But that is not all we 
have reason to do. To see this, let us briefly contrast moral value with economic value. 
Imagine you are an executive, running a business—a factory. You have a number of 
different machines on your assembly line. Each contributes to your overall productivity, 
and each generates expenses. You care about each machine only insofar as it affects your 
profits. If one becomes a net cost, then you will shut it off without compunction. If you can 
realise more profit by taking one machine apart, and using it as spares for another, then 
you will do so.  
If ethics were like business, then we would maximise value just as the executive max-
imises profits. We would treat people like the executive treats her machines. We would 
harm one person just in case doing so would deliver a marginally greater benefit to anoth-
er. This treats her as a mere site of value, because her weight in our deliberations is ex-
hausted by the value that is instantiated in her life. We would even use people to benefit 
others—for example, harvesting an unwilling victim’s organs to save the lives of others. 
This treats him as a tool for realising value, breaking him down for spare parts like a ma-
chine.25 
Ethics is not like business. People are not mere sites or tools for the realisation of value. 
Recognising this amounts to recognising that people have moral status. Why do we have 
moral status? As Walzer concedes in Just and Unjust Wars Walzer [2006b: 54], explaining 
this is no easy task. My own view is that it is grounded in our fundamental freedom—our 
capacity as rational agents to make our own choices, for our own reasons. But even if you 
disagree about what grounds moral status, you can, I think, agree with my account of its 
normative implications. And, like Walzer, I think we can most fruitfully understand those 
in terms of individual rights.  
Our fundamental human rights to life and liberty protect us against being treated as 
mere sites or tools for the realisation of value. To sacrifice my interests for the greater 
good, or to use me as a means to advance the greater good, is not merely to harm me (sub-
tracting that much value from the world) but to infringe my rights. That your action in-
fringes my rights constitutes an additional reason against harming me, over and above the 
disvalue realised by doing so. This means you cannot justify harming me, just in case you 
could thereby do marginally more good. This is the difference between people and ma-
chines in an assembly line: machines do not have rights, so the executive can shut them 
down or use them for spare parts just in case doing so will maximise her profits. 
Different ethical theories will understand these rights in different ways. I want to insist 
only on three points. First, our fundamental rights should have neither trivial nor absolute 
weight. They are not mere tie-breakers. But nor must we respect them though the heavens 
should fall. Their weight should be somewhere between those two extremes.  
Second, the weight of a right can vary depending on how it is infringed. Here the 
site/tool distinction is important again. It is harder to justify infringing people’s rights as a 
means to advance your goals, than to justify harming them incidentally, in the course of 
pursuing your goals. In the former case, you use the victim, like the executive breaking up 
the machine for parts. You treat your victim as a tool. In the latter case, you are no better 
off for the victim’s presence than you would have been had he not been there. His death 
(for example) is a regrettable, but unavoidable, side-effect of achieving your goals. In this 
case, you treat him as a mere site for the realisation of value.  
                                                        
25 The central idea here is obviously Kantian, but it finds its clearest modern expression in Quinn [1989]; 
Tadros [2011]. 
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Just as it is worse to use someone than to harm them incidentally when you are aiming 
at the good, the same is true when aiming at the bad. All the killing done by Daesh fighters 
is deeply morally odious. But publicly beheading a victim to coerce his government is 
worse than, for example, killing a passer-by in the blast when an improvised explosive de-
vice is triggered by an enemy vehicle.  
Third, even one’s most fundamental rights can be lost. Most analytical just war theo-
rists agree that if you are sufficiently responsible for an unjustified threat that is serious 
enough to make killing proportionate, and if killing you is necessary, then you can be liable 
to be killed—that is, you ‘lose or surrender’, in Walzer’s terms, your right not to be killed. 
In such cases, sacrificing you or using you as a tool to advance the good of others can be 
permissible.  
One can be responsible for a threat in virtue of posing it oneself, or contributing to it, or 
even failing to prevent it. As we saw above, this means that liability can potentially extend 
not only to the soldier who pulls the trigger, but to the commander who orders him to do 
so, and to the politicians who give the commanders their orders, and perhaps even to the 
citizens who elect the politicians.  
Unlike some other analytical just war theorists, however, I think that for you to be lia-
ble to be killed, you have to have done, or failed to do, something significant—something 
to which the loss of your fundamental rights is in some way proportionate. This might mean 
that your causal contribution was itself significant (for example, but for your order, the 
threat would not have occurred). Or it might mean that you are blameworthy for contrib-
uting as you did. The details are tricky, and need not detain us here.26 I mean simply to 
note that liability to be killed is a very serious derogation from your moral status, and it 
must fit your conduct. 
 
So, what does this all mean for the ethics of war? In essence, it shows us that not all killings 
are equally seriously wrong. This is the key element in any attempt to walk the line be-
tween realism and pacifism. When killing for just aims, killing those with rights is worse 
than killing those who have lost them; killing people as a means is worse than killing them 
as a side-effect. When killing for unjust aims, all the killing one does is wrong, but still, 
some wrongful killing is worse than others. 
But how do these categories map onto the combatant/noncombatant divide so essential 
to the war convention? Imperfectly, we must admit. Walzer was right, I think, that almost 
all noncombatants retain their rights to life. Here I disagree with the revisionists, who 
think that one can be liable to be killed in virtue of a very low degree of responsibility for a 
wrongful threat.27 If that were right, then all the noncombatants whose voluntary actions 
foreseeably contribute to their state’s capacity to wage unjust wars would be liable to be 
killed. As already noted, few adults would escape liability on these grounds.28  
This is not the place for a detailed investigation into responsibility and liability. But nor 
is one necessary. I doubt whether any theoretical account, or any intuitions about hypo-
thetical cases, could be as robust as my intuitions about the actual case of war. Ordinary 
voters and taxpayers are not liable to be killed, even when their militaries foreseeably fight 
unjust wars. Killing them intentionally does wrong them—egregiously. For example, Brit-
ish and American citizens who voted for the governments that fought an unjust war in Iraq 
in 2003, and paid the taxes that funded that war, were not liable to be killed in order to 
avert the unjust threats that the war involved. 
The best theoretical explanation for this judgement is the one alluded to above: that 
                                                        
26 For my views on liability, see Lazar [2009, 2010, 2012, 2015]. 
27 McMahan [2004, 2005, 2009].  
28 Few of them now accept that their view entails this, but I think most of their arguments to the contrary 
illegitimately apply a double standard. See McMahan [2011]; Lazar [Forthcoming]. 
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there must be some kind of fit between one’s behaviour and the fate of becoming liable to 
be killed. But once we concede that point, then we must also concede that for many com-
batants in war, even those fighting for the unjust side, this fit is absent.29 This is obviously 
true of combatants on the just side—those fighting for just aims do nothing to lose or sur-
render their rights. But, against both Walzer and the revisionists, it is true also for many 
combatants on the unjust side. Many of them neither pose threats themselves, nor con-
tribute to threats posed by their comrades. Many make no difference at all; some are a pos-
itive hindrance. As Walzer notes, many serve for good reasons—out of loyalty, and a belief 
that their cause is just. A grisly death no more fits their behaviour than it does that of many 
noncombatants. What’s more, in all actual conflicts this clean division between the ‘just 
side’ and the ‘unjust side’ will fall apart. Many combatants fighting for the ostensibly just 
side will be contributing to subsidiary unjust aims and operations and so lose their rights 
to life; many fighting for the ostensibly unjust side will be contributing to subsidiary just 
aims and operations, and so retain those rights.  
In a nutshell: if almost all noncombatants retain their rights to life in war, then many 
combatants, even on the unjust side, will keep the same rights. So, if we are to deny paci-
fism, we must reject Walzer’s dictum that legitimate acts of war respect the rights of those 
against whom they are directed. In passing, I think this makes perfect sense. The contrary 
idea is one of a ‘morally pure’ war, in which nobody’s rights are intentionally violated. I 
think such an ideal is unattainable in the real world. If just wars could be fought in which 
we intentionally killed only those who are liable to be killed, then wars would not be such 
tragic affairs. 
So, noncombatants may not be intentionally attacked, because they retain their rights 
to life. My basis for Noncombatant Immunity is therefore the same as Walzer’s. And the rea-
son killing them unintentionally can be permissible when intentional killing is not, is be-
cause we enjoy stronger protections against being harmed as a means, than against being 
harmed incidentally in the course of achieving some end. Walzer’s pragmatic argument 
for Proportionality is unnecessary: this distinction is central to plausible theories of norma-
tive ethics. 
Combatant Equality is a little trickier. Noncombatant Immunity applies to soldiers on both 
sides. But Proportionality does not apply in quite the same way, since it gives a sufficient 
condition for unintentional killing being permissible. But unjust combatants cannot kill 
permissibly in the pursuit of unjust aims, whether unintentionally or otherwise. Still, the 
basic distinction that Proportionality describes applies to unjust combatants as well, and it’s 
certainly true that if they are going to fight, then it is somewhat better that they kill non-
combatants unintentionally than that they do so as a means. This means that something 
close to Combatant Equality is true: just combatants should respect the rules of war because 
only by doing so can they fight justly; unjust combatants should respect those rules be-
cause they thereby minimise the wrongfulness of their actions.30  
However, there is more work still to do. As just argued, many combatants, even on the 
unjust side, retain their rights not to be killed. So if my justification for Noncombatant Im-
munity is not to lead to pacifism, we must explain how attacking nonliable combatants can 
be permissible, without thereby justifying attacks on nonliable noncombatants. We need 
to show that killing innocent noncombatants is worse than killing innocent combatants. I 
defend this principle at length elsewhere.31 Here I will just allude to three arguments in its 
favour.  
First, the very fact that noncombatants are so much likelier than combatants to retain 
their rights to life itself makes killing innocent noncombatants worse than killing innocent 
                                                        
29 I argue for this point at length in Lazar [2010]. 
30 For a similar approach to vindicating Combatant Equality, see Haque [Forthcoming]. 
31 Lazar [2015]. 
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combatants, because it is other things equal worse to kill someone more riskily than less 
riskily. Intentionally killing civilians amounts to taking a very great risk of killing an inno-
cent person; intentionally killing combatants takes a somewhat lesser risk. Riskier killings 
are worse than less risky ones, because they display a greater readiness to treat one’s target 
as a site or tool for the realisation of one’s ends, and because they more seriously under-
mine our interest in security. 
Second, noncombatants are more vulnerable and defenceless than are combatants. 
They are likelier to suffer more severe harm from any given threat that they face; and they 
are less able to remediate the risks imposed on them. We have basic duties to protect those 
who are most vulnerable (as long as they are not liable to suffer some harm), and attacking 
the vulnerable not only violates their ordinary rights to life and liberty, but breaches these 
additional duties of care. Additionally, when we attack the defenceless, we deprive them of 
control over some of their most important interests. We render them dependent on us or 
on their defenders. This additional harm compounds the wrongfulness of killing them: 
whenever you kill a defenceless person, you have not merely killed her, but disempowered 
her as well. 
Third, even combatants who pose only justified threats typically enjoy weaker protec-
tions against intentional harm than do noncombatants, even though neither are liable to 
be killed. This is because most combatants have no control over whether the threats they 
pose are just. Everything from their perspective could have been identical, but they would 
have been killing unjustly. So, it’s true that they are not liable to be killed, because they 
contribute only to just threats. But that is a matter of luck. And we owe more to those who 
respect our rights robustly (such as noncombatants who do not pose threats), than we do 
to those who respect our rights just as a matter of luck.  
These are just sketches of arguments that I make in detail elsewhere (Lazar [2015]). But 
they should give an idea of the necessary direction of travel. The basic strategy is to show 
that, even though Walzer was wrong to think that only noncombatants retain their rights 
to life in war, nonetheless Walzer’s revisionist critics are wrong when they argue that just 
combatants enjoy undiminished moral protections against harm, and that all unjust com-
batants are liable to be killed. Matters are much messier than either side supposed. Inter-
estingly, the real challenge is not to explain why noncombatants are immune from inten-
tional attack in war—that part is relatively easy: because they retain their rights to life. In-
stead, it is to explain why killing unjust combatants is permissible, given that many of 
them also are not liable to be killed. The task is less one of explaining noncombatant im-
munity, but of explaining combatant non-immunity. If we cannot do this, then there is ul-
timately no stopping point short of endorsing pacifism. 
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